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RECENT CASES
migratory inclinations. So long as the minimum requirements of due
process are met, the judgments of a court of equity in the interests of
children of divorced parents should not be defeated by rules of
procedure. 5
Still, in fairness to either of the parents, it seems that something
more should be required than directing notice to the last known ad-
dress by ordinary mail. Cammack, J., isolated the problem in the
principal case when he concurred with the majority because of the
clear meaning of the rule but questioned the adequacy of that rule in
cases involving a request for substantive relief. He suggested that the
rule might be amended to provide that:
[I]f a motion is for an order or judgment granting a claim for sub-
stantive relief in the nature of a judgment in personam, which relief
is in addition to that sought in the original complaint in the action
or granted by a previous order or judgment in the action, and the
opposing party is not represented by an attorney, notice of the motion
should be served by registered mail.'8
This recommendation is heartily endorsed with one reservation.
It is felt that the words "in the nature of a judgment in personam"
should be omitted. Thus broadened, the recommendation would ex-
tend the use of registered mail to motions for an order or judgment
granting a claim for any substantive relief not previously requested in
the action. In divorce cases, for example, this would bring motions to
modify the child custody provisions of the judgment within the
registered mail category. Such a modification of the present rule would
not only increase the probability of actual notice, but would also tend
to obviate the likelihood of service by gesture.
Robert E. Adams
EVIDENCE-USE OF TnUTH SERum STATEMENTs IN SuBSTANTATInG THE
TESTrONY OF AN IMfPEACHED WrrNEss-The defendant was convicted
of sodomy and statutory rape committed on a fifteen year old girl.
At the trial the girl testified in detail concerning the circumstances of
the offenses. Following her testimony the defense then impeached her
statements by introducing her letters and affidavit retracting all the
allegations of sexual misconduct. In an effort to rebuild their witness's
testimony the prosecution called a psychiatrist who testified that in
his opinion the girl was telling the truth when making the charges.
15 There are few if any inflexible rules of procedure in this kind of case.
Shallcross v. Shallcross, 135 Ky. 418, 122 S.W. 223 (1909).16 Benson v. Benson, supra note 13 (concurring opinion).
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The psychiatrist's opinion was formed on the basis of a complete
clinical examination that included not only psychological and personal
tests but a sodium pentothal ("truth serum") test. Also the prosecu-
tion played to the jury a tape recording of the girl's statements made
while under the influence of sodium pentothal. On appeal the
prosecution argued for the admissibility of both the psychiatrist's
opinion testimony and the tape recording, contending that under
general principles of evidence prior consistent statements are admis-
sible to rehabilitate the testimony of an impeached witness if they
are made when there was no motive to distort.' Thus, because sodium
pentothal releases the witness's inhibitions and any motive he may
have to distort the truth, the testimony has sufficient guaranty of truth
to be admissible under the general rule. However the Court of Appeals
rejected the prosecution's arguments and reversed the conviction.
Held: The admission of a tape recording of statements made by a
material witness while under the influence of sodium penotbal is
prejudicial error, even though not admitted as substantive evidence
but only to rehabilitate the impeached witness's testimony. Lindsey v.
U. S., 287 F. 2d 893 (1956).
The court agreed that sodium pentothal did release the inhibitions
and possibly remove the motive to distort the truth but there was still
not a sufficient guaranty of truth to warrant admission because re-
leased inhibitions also give the subject's imagination full sway "and
stimulate unrepressed expression not only of fact but of fancy and
suggestion as well".2 One writer has reached substantially the same
conclusion and has suggested that ".... truthful answers are not always
forthcoming when the scopolamine test is applied. Thus any informa-
tion which one received in a criminal interrogation must be carefully
scrutinized to see if supporting physical evidence can be obtained".3
I McCormick, Evidence at 374 (1954):
"If the offering party has testified the statement may be offered,
not to prove the facts stated therein, but as a prior consistent state-
ment to support his credibility, escaping the rule against such form
of support by reason of the foundation showing the unique trust-
worthiness of this type of prior statement."
Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 1126 (3rd ed. 1940). This is also the Kentucky rule.
See Eubank v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 150, 275 S.W. 630, 633 (1925):
"Where, however, a witness has been assailed on the ground
that his story is a recent fabrication, or that he has some motive for
testifying falsely, proof that he gave a similar account of the matter
when the motive did not exist, before the effect of such an account
could be foreseen, or when motive or interest would have induced a
different statement, is admissible."
2 Lindsey v. U.S., 237 F. 2d 893, 896 (1956), referring to 62 Yale L.J. 315,
319 (1953).
3 Muehlberger, Interrogation Under Drug Influence, 42 Journal of Criminal
Law, Criminology, and Police Science 513, 519.
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Because the effect of "truth serum" was so critical in the decision
a medical description and analysis of the drug and its results are
necessary for a full understanding of the case. Several different types
of drugs have been used as "truth serums", e.g. scopolamine,4 or more
often a barbiturate such as sodium pentothal5 or sodium amytal,G be-
cause they are non-toxic and have fewer side effects. 7 The depressant
effect of the drug and the resultant release of inhibitions was explained
in a combined study made by two members of Yale University Law
School faculty and two members of the Medical School faculty as
follows:
They act as a central nervous system depressant, primarily
on the cerebral cortex-the highest level of the nervous system-and
on the diencephalon or "between-brain", and their pathways ...
The particular type of behavior manifested under the influence of
amytal is a complex resultant of the interaction of the personality of
the subject, his specific physiological and bio-chemical reaction to it,
and what is happening to him at the time.8
The result of the depressant on the central nervous system is to re-
lease the subject's inhibitions making it less likely that he will con-
sciously suppress or distort the facts. But this is not always a certainty
and as the article points out any one particular subject's reaction may
vary considerably from the theoretical norm, depending on his per-
sonality, physical reaction, and what is happening to him. In spite of
the many variables involved in any conclusion based on truth serum
tests, such evidence should probably be allowed to a certain extent in
modem day court proceedings. The problem is to determine when
and to what extent truth serum evidence should be admissible.
The principal case points up the two occasions in a trial proceeding
in which counsel may attempt to introduce truth serum evidence.
First, a transcript of the questions and answers or a tape recording of
the experiments conducted on the subject while under the influence
of the drug may be read or played before the jury. Second, opinion
testimony of a qualified expert, normally a psychiatrist, predicated in
4 Dorland, The American Illustrated Medical Dictionary (20th ed. 1946)
defines Scopolamine as follows: "A mydriatic alkaloid, the scopoline ester of
tropic acid, from the root of ... solanaceous plants. It is a poisonous nerve de-
pressant, mydriatic and hypnotic, and is used in mania, delerium, insomnia,
alcoholic tremor and marked sexual excitement."
5 Id.: "Pentothal Sodium- . . . used as an intravenous anesthetic and
hypnotic."
6 Blakiston's New Gould Medical Dictionary (1st ed. 1949) defines Sodium
Amytal as follows: "[A] white, hygroscopic, granular powder, soluble in water or
alcohol. ... It is used as a sedative and hypnotic in the control of insomnia and
preliminary to surgical anesthesia, and as an anti-convulsant."
7 See 62 Yale L.J. 315 (1953).
8 Id. at 317.
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whole or in part on a sodium pentothal or other truth serum interview
may be sought to be admitted. Not only do these two uses of this type
of interview present difficulties but there is an area of related and in-
cidental problems, such as the matter of referring to the drug used as
a "truth serum" and allowing inferences to be drawn from the failure
of a witness to submit to the tests. The probative value of evidence
in the first two situations and prejudicial effect of the latter will be
discussed in the remainder of this comment.
Because of the nature of the drug itself a tape recording or any
other method of getting the experiment directly before the jury should
be inadmissible. These tests only have validity if they are interpreted
by an expert in the field and even then there is considerable chance
for error. A majority of cases seem to have agreed with this and gen-
erally have not recognized the reliability of such tests. In fact many
courts are so skeptical as to question the admissibility of expert testi-
mony based on drug tests.9
Based on a number of experiments with these serums it was stated in
one article,
Rarely could the information obtained under the influence
of the drug be interpreted directly in the light of its manifest content.
It was useful only when integrated into the fabric of the patient's
conflictual tendencies and anxieties. The verbalized material was
valued neither as representative of proven deeds nor as demonstrated
facts, but simply as psychological data-meaningful and helpful only
in the context of the clinician's knowledge of the patient.' 0
The lay jurors ordinarily do not have sufficient understanding of the
tests to allow them to properly interpret the results. The principal
case suggested that the situation could be improved if the jurors were
not limited to the use of only one sense, merely hearing the tests, but
9See People v. McCraken, 39 Cal. 2d 336, 246 P. 2d 913 (1952). The trial
court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow the defendant to be sub-jected to "truth drugs" while on the witness stand. State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M.
257, 243 P. 2d 325 (1952); People v. Cullen, 37 Cal. 2d 614, 234 P. 2d 1 (1951).
It is not a prejudicial error for a trial court to refuse admission of the opinion of a
psychiatrist based on sodium pentothal tests. The statements would be "hearsay,
self-serving, and conjectural," and it is doubtful if they would be admissible;
Henderson v. State, 94 Okl. Cr. 45, 230 P. 2d 495 (1951); People v. McNickol,
100 Cal. App. 2d 554, 224 P. 2d 21 (1950); Orange v. Commonwealth, 191 West
Va. 423, 61 SE 2d 267 (1950); also see annotation, 23 ALR 2d 1306, 1310 (1952).
The New York cases have been inconsistent in this matter. People v.
Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 89 N.E. 2d 925 (1942), allowed the admission of truth
serum evidence. But ten years later, People v. Ford, 304 N.Y. 679, 107 NE 2d
595 (1952), held that although the accused's mental ability for premeditation is
in issue the psychiatrist could not testify that in his opinion, predicated on sodium
amytal tests, the accused was not mentally capable of premeditation. The dissent
felt this was reversible error because this was one of the "methods set up
objectively by the medical profession for the proper determination of such
.claims", that is, claims of mental derangement. 107 NE 2d 595 at 596.
10 Supra note 7 at 318.
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were allowed to see them as well. However, even if they were to see as
well as hear the conduct of such an examination it would not remove
a more fundamental problem, their own lack of knowledge and back-
ground which severely limits or prevents a correct interpretation of
what they observed. It is doubtful if the lay juror is any more capable
of forming a correct opinion based on the recording than he would be
of diagnosing the disease in a workmen's compensation case or per-
forming an autopsy to determine cause of death. If this is true and
direct statements made under the influence of the drug should be in-
admissible, may the courts still allow use of expert opinion testimony
predicated on truth serum examinations?
A psychiatrist may qualify as any other expert and thus be allowed
to venture his opinion within the purview of his expertness." Testi-
mony of a psychiatrist is particularly helpful in cases involving sex
crimes where very often the testimony of a single prosecuting witness
will be the only testimony of an eye witness to the sex act. The
credibility of this critically important witness becomes extremely
valuable in a decision of the case. Because of this the American Bar
Association's Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence
has stated,
The penalties for sex crimes are very severe,-justly so in
most cases. But the very severity of the penalty calls for special pro-
cedural precautions. ... We recommend that in all charges of sex
offenses, the complaining witness be required to be examined before
trial by competent psychiatrists for the purpose of ascertaining her
probable credibility, the report to be presented in evidence. 2
The opinion testimony of a psychiatrist also becomes important to
establish any mental derangement or the ability to premeditate a
crime.
Examinations conducted by a competent psychiatrist in which
"truth serums" are used are not open to the same objections as the use
of tape recordings of them before a jury. This is because the expert,
aware of the drug and its effect, knows that the subject's statements
cannot be taken literally, that he is very likely to tell fantasy as well
as truth, and is extremely susceptible to suggestion. These factors
should be taken into account by one who has had experience with the
examinations, and are more likely to be placed in their proper per-
spective in weighing the value of the witness's statements and in form-
ing a conclusion as to his "truth and veracity".
There is a third area of related problems connected with truth
"1 See McCormick, supra note 1, on expert testimony beginning on page 28.
12 1938-39 Report of the American Bar Associations Committee on the
Improvement of the Law of Evidence, cited in 3 Wigmore, Sec. 924(a), at 466.
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serum testimony. One, occurring in jurisdictions admitting truth serum
evidence, is Should use of the term, "truth serum", be allowed before
the court and jury? These words have gained popular recognition,13
but as one writer has suggested, "The drug is not a serum and as
subsequent investigation disclosed, it does not invariably lead to
truth".1 No doubt subtle use of the term before the jury could have
a very misleading effect in their minds as to the reliability of the tests.
As a result it probably could be prejudicial error in most criminal
proceedings to use the term and certainly should be if no clarifying
definition is given it.
Another related problem, occurring when truth serum testimony
is not admitted, is that of commenting on and allowing inferences from
a failure to take the tests. In a recent New York case,' 5 the prosecutor
commented adversely and at length on the defendant's refusal to take
a truth serum test. The New York Court of Appeals held this to con-
stitute reversible error because it had violated the defendant's con-
stitutional protection against compulsory self-incrimination. This repre-
sents the preferable solution because to allow inferences from a per-
son's exercise of the privilege would not only be an anomalous situation
but would render it ineffectual.' 6
Conclusion
Although questions and answers or direct statements made by a
person under the influence of drugs should be inadmissible in evidence,
there is good reason to allow the testimony of an expert, normally a
psychiatrist, as to his opinion of a person's credibility based on
"narcoanalysis". Medical science seems to have advanced to the extent
that there is an awareness of the weaknesses as well as the strengths
of this type of test; that a person while under the influence of the truth
serum may relate untruths, fantasy, and is often extremely susceptible
to suggestion. But the weaknesses in the use of the test would not
prevent the testing results from having a considerable amount of
validity and usefulness if conducted and related to the court by one
who is experienced in giving them and who normally would have an
awareness that the truth serum test is only one factor to consider in
'3 Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.): "Truth Serum-a drug
administered to induce temporary truthfulness."
14 Muehlberger, supra note 3 at 514-515.
making a final evaluation of the basic personality traits and credibility
15 People v. Draper, 304 N.Y. 799, 109 N.E. 2d 342 (1952).
16 For a general discussion of inferences from a person's claim of a privilege
see 8 Wigmore Sec. 2272 (3rd ed. 1940).
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of the witness. This is particularly true since the expert witness will
be subject to cross examination as to the methods and validity of the
testing process.
Wayne I. Carroll
ILLEGAL SEARCa AND SEmIZUR-PowER OF A FEDERAL CouRT To ENioiN
A FEDERAL AGENT FROM TESTIFYING IN A STATE CouRT-The United
States Constitution prohibits illegal searches and seizures,' but makes
no mention of the admissibility of evidence so obtained before a
court. Until this century both federal and state courts accepted
the common law rule that, with few exceptions, evidence other-
wise admissible need not be excluded because it is illegally ob-
tained.2 The specific rule that in the field of searches and seizures
evidence should be excluded if it has been illegally seized was
first laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States some
seventy years ago.3 But it was not until 1914 that the rule was clearly
enunciated by that Court in Weeks v. United States4 in which the
Court held that evidence illegally obtained by federal officials in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a federal prose-
cution." However, generally, the Supreme Court has not seen fit to
I U.S. Const., Amend. 4:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
2 8 Wigmore, Evidence Secs. 2188, 2184 (3d ed. 1940). The rationalization
for the rule is that to exclude such evidence would only be to free the guilty, i.e.,
one malefactor should not claim the right to escape prosecution by reason of the
illegal acts of another. Also, if the evidence is relevant, any argument as to the
illegality of obtaining it is merely a "collateral issue."
3 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
4282 U.S. 883 (1914). The common law power of courts to develop rules
for the admissibility of evidence is a well recognized judicial function.
5 Id. at 393,
"If letters and private documents can be thus taken and held and
used as evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Con-
stitution."
For a criticism of this rule see 8 Wigamore, Evidence, Sec. 2184 at 40 (3d ed.
1940) in which he states,
"The natural way to do justice here would be to enforce the healthy
principle of the Fourth Amendment directly, i.e. by sending for the
high-banded, over-zealous marshall who had made a search without a
warrant ,imposing a thirty-day imprisonment for his contempt of the
Constitution, and then proceeding to affirm the sentence of the con-
victed criminal."
As a reply to this, it should be noted that prosecutions of the "over-zealous
marshal' have proven to be ineffective, as have civil actions against him.
